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On Explanations from ‘Geometry of Motion’
Juha Saatsi
6th July 2015
Abstract
This paper examines explanations that turn on non-local geometrical facts
about the space of possible configurations a system can occupy. I argue that
it makes sense to contrast such explanations from ‘geometry of motion’ with
causal explanations. I also explore how my analysis of these explanations
cuts across the distinction between kinematics and dynamics.
1. Introduction
2. Toy Example
3. ‘Geometry of Motion’ in Classical Mechanics
4. Beyond Classical Mechanics
5. Conclusion: a Worthwhile Distinction
1 Introduction
Most philosophers nowadays grant that not all explanations in science are causal,
but some still stubbornly defend the hegemony of causal explanations with respect
to explanations of individual events. (See for example Skow [2013].) This hege-
mony, or what remains of it, is partly maintained by the opaqueness of the nature of
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non-causal explanations: there is little agreement how to demarcate between causal
and non-causal explanations. At the same time, many people intuitively recognise
a difference between causal and non-causal explanations at least in some cases. (I
will give an example shortly.) This provides a prima facie motivation for thinking
that there is a genuine, worthwhile distinction here to be clarified. The debate can
be advanced by examining in detail some intuitively non-causal explanations in an
attempt to demarcate their explanatory credentials from causal explanations. This
paper does exactly that.
There is no reason to presuppose, prima facie, that all intuitively non-causal
explanations are of a piece. Although many non-causal explanations are broadly
speaking geometrical in character, some non-causal explanations only concern reg-
ularities, for example, as opposed to particular events.1 Such a difference may, or
may not, turn out to be relevant for demarcating between causal and non-causal
explanations. (See for example Saatsi and Pexton [2013].) Be that as it may, in this
paper I focus on explanations of particular events, since the hegemony of causal
explanations is least contentious here. I also focus on a class of explanations that
exhibits a common, unifying character.
I take as a point of inspiration a somewhat amorphous division between kin-
ematic and dynamic explanations in physics. This division resonates in interesting
ways with the non-causal vs. causal distinction. Consider, for example, a typical
(but by no means definitive) ‘textbook’ presentation of the physicists’ amorphous
distinction in the context of classical mechanics.2
Kinematics: the study of the geometry of motion; kinematics is used to relate
displacement, velocity, acceleration, and time, without reference to the cause
1For instance, it is not very clear whether there is a particular event that can be explained by
the seemingly non-causal explanation involving the ‘graph-structure’ of Königsberg’s bridges. The
explanation of Kleiber’s law discussed in (Saatsi and Pexton [2013]) only concerns a regularity.
2See for example (Beer [2010]).
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of the motion.
Dynamics: the study of the relation existing between the forces acting on a body,
the mass of the body, and the motion of the body; dynamics is used to predict
the motion caused by given forces or to determine the forces required to
produce a given motion.
If taken at face value this suggests that while dynamics is explicitly concerned with
causes, kinematic explanations are non-causal. This face-value reading turns out to
be misleading: many kinematic explanations are causal. But further reflection sup-
ports the suggestion that some explanations from ‘geometry of motion’ are indeed
non-causal. We can begin to grasp the nature of these explanations by reflecting on
typical kinematic explanations from mechanics, identifying some as non-causal.
These can then serve as exemplars of a broader notion of non-causal explanation
that is not restricted to kinematics, and is also applicable outside classical mechan-
ics. I will illustrate this broader notion with reference to other non-causal explana-
tions that turn on ‘geometry of motion’ in the way brought out by the exemplars.
As an entry point I will look at a simple toy example of a familiar, paradigmatic
kinematic explanation that is intuitively non-causal. By analysing this example I
argue that some kinematical explanations really do furnish genuinely non-causal
explanations by virtue of involving irreducibly non-local geometrical features. I
characterise the non-causal nature of this exemplar by defending it in detail against
some potential objections (§2). After that I will explore explanations that turn
on such ‘geometry of motion’ in more general terms, appropriating the exemplar
to explanations from different areas of physics (§3 and §4). The upshot will be
an account of non-causal explanations that are: (a) non-local, since they turn on
non-local geometrical facts about the space of possible configurations a system can
occupy, and (b) robust, since they are independent of the details of the underlying
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dynamics. Such explanations, although arguably non-causal, are actually not radic-
ally different from familiar causal explanations; both can be understood in similar
counterfactual terms. Nevertheless, the distinction between causal and non-causal
explanations is a worthwhile distinction, given its value in physics (§5).
2 Toy example
Take a straight stick and parallel-transport it over a closed path on the surface of a
sphere of radius r (see Figure 1).3 Returning to the starting point A, the stick has
rotated an angle α. Whence the angle α?
** FIGURE 1 – PARALLEL TRANSPORT – GOES HERE **
The explanandum is an individual event, or (to be precise) an aspect thereof,
with a natural contrast class: why α, as opposed to some other angle α′? The event
in question takes place when the stick returns to the point A. We are interested in
a why-question that presupposes that the stick started its journey earlier from this
very point: why α, given that the stick pointed in a different direction at this point
earlier? This question concerns the stick’s direction at A, but only in as far as this
differs from its earlier direction.4
You are probably familiar with the explanation, hinging on a simple regularity
that holds between the following variables characterising the set-up: α, r = radius,
and A = the area enclosed by the path:
3Mathematically speaking, a vector can be parallel transported along a smooth curve if the mani-
fold in question is equipped with an affine connection which gives a sense in which the vector must
locally ‘stay straight’ along the way.
4This why-question does not ask why the stick, returning toA, points in some particular direction
in space. Explaining the stick’s particular direction at P at the end of the journey would require
reference to its particular direction at the start of the journey. This complicates matters by introducing
a further local and causal explanatory variable into an explanation that is (I will argue) otherwise non-
causal.
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α = r−2 ×A (1)
The stick has rotated an angle α because (i) the path traversed (without rotating the
stick along the way) encloses area A of a sphere of radius r, and (ii) α depends on
variables A and r via the regularity above.5
Intuitively this strikes me as a purely geometrical, non-causal explanation, ex-
hibiting an asymmetric dependence of α on the curvature of the sphere and the area
enclosed by the loop. The explanation seems non-causal, because the variables in
question do not seem to qualify as causes of the outcome stated in the explanan-
dum. The curvature does not ‘twist’ the stick at any point along the path, and the
path on the whole determines α in a way that only depends on its non-local feature
(the area A).6 This is—as I will presently explain—a paradigmatic example of a
kinematic explanation in terms of ‘geometry of motion’.
The intuition from this toy example has to be defended against two challenges
that aim to massage it to fit the causal hegemony. In the course of vindicating the
intuition I will identify the key features of the exemplar that we can associate more
5This dependence of α on A and r−2 is easiest to establish for a triangular path as in Figure
1, but the results generalises to arbitrary closed paths that can be approximated with some complex
polygon that can be divided into triangles.
6The distinction between local and non-local properties of geometrical objects (such as a curve)
is standardly drawn both in mathematics and physics. (See for example Banchoff and Lovett [2010].)
Local properties, such as local curvature, can be attributed to a small neighbourhood of a point on a
curve. Non-local properties, by contrast, are only applicable to the whole curve (without being mere
sums over local properties, in the way a curve’s overall length is, for instance). The area enclosed
by a closed curve is a paradigmatic example of a non-local property of the curve. (The total area of
a sheet of paper is not a non-local property of the sheet in this sense, however, for it is just a sum of
the areas of its parts.) For another example, consider the non-local topological property of a rubber
band: being a closed loop. Admittedly being a closed loop depends on local facts: for example, one
can cut open a closed loop at a single point. So this sense of non-locality is clearly different from the
non-locality associated with quantum mechanics, for example, and the non-local features supervene
on the local ones. But the topological feature remains non-local in an interesting sense: the point
of the present distinction is to bring out a way in which one has to take the whole rubber band into
account in determining whether it is closed or not. Being a closed loop is not a feature applicable at
all to any proper part of the loop, and it is not a ‘sum’ of the local features. If some explanandum
depends only on this feature of the rubber band, then any feature attributed to any proper part of
the band (location, local connectedness, curvature, what-have-you) says nothing about whether the
explanandum holds or not. (Thanks to a referee for pressing me on this.)
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generally with the kind of non-causal explanations ‘from geometry of motion’ that
I am interested in.
Here is the first challenge. One might argue—in the spirit of (Skow [2013]),
perhaps—that the explanation is causal after all, since it does provide some inform-
ation about relevant causes. This line of thought is part and parcel of a tradition
crystallised in David Lewis’s influential ‘Causal Explanation’, according to which
‘to explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history’ (Lewis
[1986], p. 217). The explanandum at stake has a causal history involving whatever
causes performed the parallel transport as described, and the geometrical explana-
tion seems to provide some information about it, to boot. After all, it is explicitly
said that no causes rotated the stick en route, and it is implicitly said that some
causes (perhaps relating to your intentions and actions) were responsible for taking
the stick around the loop. Hence, the explanation allegedly is causal after all, albeit
in a somewhat roundabout way.7
I rebut the first challenge as follows. The explanation is not a causal one, since
none of its explanatory power is due to the causal information it provides.8 Follow-
ing Woodward ([2003]) and others, I take a paradigmatic form of scientific explan-
ation to consist in showing how the explanandum depends on the explanans. The
explanation given above of the value of α does exactly this by virtue of relating α
to r andA in a way that brings out a precise and informative functional dependence
between these relevant variables. Armed with the regularity expressed in equation
(1) we know precisely how α would have been different had r and/or A had differ-
ent values. By contrast, the (minimal and vague) causal information provided by
7Cf. Skow’s ([2013]) criterion for causal explanation:
A body of fact partially causally explains [event] E iff it is a body of fact about what
causes, if any,E had; or if it is a body of facts about what it would have taken for some
specific alternative or range of alternatives to E to have occurred instead. (p. 213)
8Lange ([2013], pp. 495-6) presses this point in connection with different non-causal explana-
tions.
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the explanation does not amount to anything like an informative functional depend-
ence of α on the existence of some causes (or absences of others). They are better
regarded as contingent features that are presupposed by the why question: whence
α, assuming that the stick somehow performs the parallel transport? Moreover,
any details of the specific causes and dynamics involved are simply supererogat-
ory, since the explanandum is actually completely independent from the actual laws
of motion and the forces involved—as long as the presuppositions that are part of
the why-question are satisfied. (See Lange [2013].)
So, arguably all the explanatory power springs from the functional dependence
of α on the sphere’s curvature and the area enclosed by the loop. Grasping this
dependence in sufficient detail gives one something to work with: if you wish
the angle to shift only half the original amount, for example, you can accordingly
‘manipulate’ (broadly speaking) the sphere’s radius or the area enclosed by the
path to make it happen. This complies with the spirit of Woodward’s ([2013])
‘manipulationist’ account of causal explanation:
[Causal explanations] furnish information that is potentially relevant to ma-
nipulation and control: they tell us how, if we were able to change the value
of one or more variables, we could change the value of other variables. (p. 6)
You would, of course, have to perform the parallel transport anew to do this,
because the dependence of α on these variables is non-local. So, even though you
may be able to thus broadly speaking ‘manipulate’ the explanans variables, this
cannot be achieved by a surgical intervention on any relatively local part of the
path. Furthermore, changing of the value of an explanans variable (e.g. radius)
need not involve anything like an intervention in Woodward’s sense at all: whether
or not a change in these variables is caused by something (e.g. air pressure inside a
balloon) is neither here nor there for the explanation at stake. Thus, the explanatory
dependence does not appear causal, as the explanatory geometrical features—the
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sphere’s curvature combined with the area enclosed by the loop—do not boil down
to any localisable or intervenable features that ‘make a difference’ in a difference-
making sense associated with causation.
The last claim requires careful elaboration, as this is where the second chal-
lenge comes in. For one might argue—in the spirit of (Strevens [2008]), say—that
the pertinent geometrical variables can be construed as causal after all, despite
not being localisable. This line of thought hinges on the notion that causes qua
difference-makers typically involve an abstraction from some ultra-specific causal
facts. For example: in causally explaining the breaking of a window that happened
to lie along a rock’s path, we appeal to those causal features that made a difference
to the breaking (as opposed to not breaking): the rock hitting the window in some
‘sufficiently impactful’ manner, which can be realized by countless specific com-
binations of the rock’s hardness; a specific location of the impact; a specific mo-
mentum that is high enough for that location, etc. We typically explain with causes
thus identified by a higher-level description of the system that abstracts away from
the unnecessary specifics that a true lower-level causal description would attribute
to the system.9
Applying this line of thought to a simple geometrical example shows how
non-local geometrical features can be causal qua difference-makers. Consider a
paradigmatic equilibrium explanation, for instance: why does a ball eventually end
up at the bottom of a concave bowl, when released just inside the bowl’s rim? An
ultra-specific causal description involves the specific forces acting on the ball over
time, due to air resistance and the specific parts of the bowl that are in contact
with it before reaching the energy-minimising equilibrium state. But clearly those
very causes and parts of the bowl are not the difference-makers with respect to the
explanandum at stake, for the outcome would not be any different if the ball was
9See (Strevens [2008]) for a philosophy of causation and causal explanation that makes the most
of this idea.
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released at some other point along the bowl’s rim. (Ditto regarding the specific de-
tails concerning the amount of air resistance and friction, and the strength of grav-
ity, for example—as long as these causal factors are large enough.) What makes
a difference, rather, is the bowl’s concave shape. Although this difference-maker
is clearly a geometrical, non-local feature of the system, it is also a clearly iden-
tifiable causal feature that makes a difference for the explanandum at stake, given
the fundamental causal facts in play. The fact that an explanation in terms of this
difference-maker abstracts away from the unnecessary specifics of a lower-level
causal description does not make it any less causal—according to the advocates
of the difference-making concept of causation at least.10 So, surely, the challenge
goes, we can similarly construe as causal the dependence of α on r and A.
But not so: there are critical disanalogies between the two cases. In particu-
lar, in the case of the bowl there is always an ultra-specific causal description that
can be associated with the high-level ‘geometrical’ explanation. Indeed, the ex-
planatoriness of the ‘geometrical’ explanation in the case of the bowl requires the
existence of some such specific causal description: the ‘geometrical’ explanation
breaks down if it is not taken to imply something about the explanatory relev-
10Woodward ([2003]) also regards the equilibrium explanation causal, saying that this is an upshot
of his ‘broad notion of causal explanation according to which, roughly, any explanation that proceeds
by showing how an outcome depends (where the dependence in question is not logical or concep-
tual) on other variables or factors counts as causal’ (p. 6). The qualification ‘roughly’ is critical here;
without this qualification the notion of causation would be too liberal, including automatically too
many explanations under the causal heading (as Woodward clearly recognises elsewhere). The qual-
ification relates to the interventionist aspect of Woodward’s account, the idea being that the notion
of intervention makes sense with respect to the shape of the bowl, for instance. This judgment seems
right on the basis of our pretheoretic folk conception of causation, which takes causation to be a
relatively local matter. We must allow our pretheoretic folk conception of causation to informWood-
ward’s account to some extent, at least, due to the oft-noted conceptual circularity in Woodward’s
account: causation is characterised partly in terms of intervention, which itself is a causal notion. We
need some idea of causation to get the account started. The fact that the folk conception of causation
takes it to be a relatively local matter renders some variables non-intervenable, as Woodward notes
for example in admitting dimensionality of spacetime as a variable on which the stability of planetary
orbits non-causally depends. The vagueness in our folk conception of causation leads to a degree of
vagueness in the distinction between intervenable and non-intervenable variables, and correspond-
ingly in the demarcation between causal and non-causal explanations. In unclear borderline cases we
can appeal to other theoretical benefits of drawing the line in a particular way.
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ance of the gravitational and frictional forces involved. By contrast, in our toy
example this is not so: the validity of this geometrical explanation actually does
not imply anything at all about some specific lower-level causes involved. The
explanation would hold just the same—it would explain equally well and for the
exact same reasons—even if no forces were in play at all. Thus, the fact that some
non-localisable geometrical feature (such as being concave) may count as a causal
qua difference-maker does not imply that all geometrical explanations are causal
in this sense. After all, higher-level causal difference-makers are obtained by ab-
straction from lower-level causal facts, and while such an abstraction takes place in
the case of the equilibrium explanation, it does not take place in the toy example.
The toy example thus has explanatory robustness that distinguishes it from explan-
ations such as the bowl case: it is fully independent of the details of the underlying
dynamics. The explanation would function just the same, even if there is no un-
derlying causal dynamics at all. (By contrast, Strevens’s analysis of higher-level
causal explanations is premised on causal fundamentalism: the idea that there is a
network of causal influences at the fundamental level that ultimately underwrites
the truths about higher-level causal relevance.)11
We can appeal to this kind of distinctive robustness in demarcating explana-
tions akin to the toy example from causal explanations that appeal to geometrical
features. Thus, I conclude that the second challenge need not compel us to give
up the intuition that we have a non-causal explanatory dependence at stake in the
11Admittedly the bowl case has considerable modal robustness as well, but this is largely due to
a high degree of abstraction in the explanandum itself. That is, the abstraction from ‘unnecessary
specifics’ in causal difference-making explanations is licensed by a degree of abstraction in the ex-
planandum itself. To wit, there are countless ways for a window to end up broken, and there are
countless of ways for a ball to end up at the bottom of a bowl. Instead of the very broad question,
‘Why did the ball eventually end up at the bottom when released just inside the bowl’s rim?’, we
can ask a much more specific one: ‘Why did the ball end up at the bottom in 17.5435 seconds,
given g = 9.80665m/s2, such-and-such air pressure, temperature, etc.?’ Having a concave shape
no longer functions as an explanatory difference-maker, because the specific concave shape now
does make a difference—for almost all concave shapes—to the time it takes for the ball to reach the
equilibrium.
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toy example. This vindication of the toy example as non-causal may not be wa-
tertight; perhaps intuitions also differ in this regard at this point. Still, I believe to
have shown that there is a principled line that can be drawn between the toy ex-
ample, on the one hand, and explanations—geometrical or otherwise—that come
out as straightforwardly causal by the lights of the leading counterfactual accounts
causal explanation. The rest of the paper amounts to a case for regarding this line
as a worthwhile one one to draw. (Given my pre-theoretic grasp of causation I
also regard it completely natural to signify this distinction by the contrast between
‘causal’ vs. ‘non-causal’, although ultimately I care less about framing the distinc-
tion in this way, and more about recognising its philosophical importance more
generally.)
Having characterised the nature of the explanation furnished by the toy ex-
ample, let us summarise its key features. The explanation of the specific angle α is
geometrical by virtue of turning on the dependence of α on geometrical variables:
the area A inside the loop, and the radius r quantifying the curvature of the sphere.
The explanans variables are non-local: the explanation boils down to non-local
geometrical facts about the (relevant features of the) sphere and the area enclosed
by the whole path.12 The explanatory value of these non-local geometrical facts
is not dependent on any assumptions about underlying dynamics or causal struc-
ture of the world (nor does it have anything to do with the degree of abstractness
of the explanandum). Indeed, the explanation is fully robust in the sense that it is
completely independent from any laws of motion or forces involved.13 The explan-
atory dependence at stake is asymmetric: α depends on A and r, not vice versa,
in a way that supports a broadly ‘manipulationist’ reading and provides corres-
12In as far as the explanatory geometrical facts are faithfully represented by mathematics, the
explanation is a distinctly mathematical one (see Lange [2013]).
13The explanatory geometrical facts are in this sense fully explanatory of the explanandum, unless
there are causal facts (‘twisting’ the stick en route) also involved, in which case the explanation of α
requires the geometrical part as a distinct and indispensable explanatory component.
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ponding counterfactual information (compare: what-if-things-had-been-different
questions in Woodward [2003]). Finally, given the set-up of the toy example, there
are constraints on possible states of the stick, imposed by the spherical surface
one the one hand, and by the requirement of parallel transport on the other.
As said, I also take the toy example to provide an exemplar of a type of non-
causal explanation. (As such it provides a straightforward counter example to the
idea that all explanations of particular events are causal—see for example Skow
[2013].)14 But what exactly makes the explanation non-causal? In responding to
the two challenges above I suggested that this is due to both (i) the non-local char-
acter of the explanans variables, as well as (ii) robustness of the explanation with
respect to variation in the dynamical facts (including laws) involved. It is these
two features that demarcate this type of non-causal explanation, since the other
features are typical to causal explanations nicely captured by popular counterfac-
tual accounts (such as Woodward’s [2003]). I will further analyse the nature and
role of these demarcating features below by first arguing that neither non-locality
nor robustness are singly sufficient for rendering an explanation non-causal. Then,
the recognition that the demarcating features are not specific to kinematics points
towards a more general appreciation of non-causal explanations from ‘geometry of
motion’.
3 ‘Geometry of motion’ in classical mechanics
Having described and defended an exemplar of non-causal explanation, I now wish
to explore in broader terms other explanations that it can be assimilated with. This
14To be exact, Skow defends the idea that all explanations of particular events are causal—except
for those that clearly are not, namely ‘in-virtue-of’ explanations. For example, a chemist arguably
thus explains the fragility of a piece of glass in terms of its molecular structure; more generally, such
explanations ‘explain why some fact obtains by citing some other fact or facts that ‘ground’ the target
fact, that are the ‘deeper’ facts ‘in virtue of which’ the target fact obtains’ (Skow [2013], p. 3). I see
no reason to think that the toy example should be classified as a ‘grounding’ explanation, as opposed
to a counterfactual explanation based on non-causal dependence.
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section will locate the key features of the toy example in some actual explanations
in classical mechanics. The next section goes beyond mechanics with illustrations
from other areas of physics.
Recall the initial characterisation of kinematics as a ‘study of geometry of mo-
tion’. On their classic treatise on theoretical kinematics Bottema and Roth ([1979])
begin by presenting the subject matter in similar terms:
Formally, kinematics is that branch of mechanics which treats the phenomenon
of motion without regard to the cause of the motion. In kinematics there is
no reference to mass or force; the concern is only with relative positions and
their changes. (p. vii)
If kinematics (thus construed) furnishes explanations, these have the potential to
be non-causal by virtue of being completely independent of the cause of motion.
The toy example exemplifies how this potential can be realised: the toy example
is a kinematical explanation that concerns the ‘geometry of motion’ that provides
only information about relative positions and their changes with respect to a stick
constrained to parallel transport on a spherical surface. This information brings out
explanatory, counterfactual dependencies by reference to the relevant geometrical
features of the space of possible states. Furthermore, these can be explanatorily
independent of the system’s dynamics or causes of motion, making the explan-
ation robust. The geometrical features need not be independent from dynamics
and forces in any fundamental metaphysical sense, of course; the independence
can be only relative to a level of description. The spherical surface in the toy ex-
ample, for instance, is assumed to be rigid so as to support the weight of a straight
stick; at a lower level of description there are forces in play corresponding to this
rigidity. But the kinematic explanation is robust so that the details about those
forces—whatever they are—are completely ‘screened off’ from explanatory relev-
ance by the assumptions regarding the sphere’s rigid shape (presupposed by the
13
why-question at stake). That is, we can ‘vary’ the forces and laws responsible for
rigidity and for the geometrical features of the surface and the stick as much as
we like without affecting the kinematic explanation in any way. The non-causal
explanatory dependencies have such modal independence, even if some of the fea-
tures of the explanans physically depend on underlying causal mechanisms or laws.
(See Lange [2013].)
Kinematic explanations are robust by virtue of being independent of dynamical
features. I have argued that some kinematic explanations are non-causal due to
incorporating explanatory geometrical features that are furthermore non-local. It
is the combination of non-locality and robustness that is needed to drive a wedge
between non-causal explanations from geometry of motion, and explanations that
appeal to non-local geometrical features as causally difference makers (as in the
case of the bowl). Clearly many kinematic explanations do not tick the box of
non-locality, despite being robust. I would not argue that such explanations are
non-causal.
Consider the following elementary kinematic explanation, for instance. A mo-
tor bike starts from rest and has a constant acceleration. Why does it travel 100
meters in 4.47 seconds? Because its rate of acceleration a = 10m/s2 and the
time it takes to travel distance s depends on the rate of constant acceleration as
per t =
√
2s/a. This equation provides explanatory counterfactual information:
had the (constant) acceleration been different, the time would have been different
accordingly. This explanation is kinematic since it says nothing about the forces
in play or the laws of evolution. But despite being kinematic, the explanation is
straightforwardly causal: the explanans variable a attributes a local feature to the
motorbike, namely its acceleration at any given point, that makes a difference to
how swiftly it covers the distance.15
15Think of the dependence between the variables t, s, and a in terms of a graph plotting the
velocity v as a function of t. (Acceleration a gives the slope of the graph.) The area under the line
14
So, a face value reading of textbook characterisation of kinematics as ‘the
study of classical mechanics which describes the motion without consideration of
the causes of motion’ is misleading, since ‘cause’ (as philosophers understand the
term) cannot be simply equated with ‘force’, ‘energy’, or some other notion that
clearly falls on the dynamics’ side of physicists’ division.
Nevertheless, there are various explanations in kinematics that turn on ‘geo-
metry of motion’ in a non-causal way by virtue of satisfying both non-locality and
robustness, as in the case of the toy example. There are interesting, much less
toy-ish real-life explanations to exemplify this, too. Consider, for instance, the fol-
lowing simple device consisting of two rigid 10cm long arms XY and YZ joined
together by a hinge (Y), and a wheel (W) rotating around a fixed point on the arm
YZ. The device can freely rotate around a pivot point (X). (Figure 2)
** FIGURE 2 – POLAR PLANIMETER – GOES HERE **
Assume the pointer end (Z) traces exactly once around a simple closed curve in the
plane.16 As it does so, the two arms move and the wheel rotates. Assume that at the
end the wheel has rolled 1cm from its starting position. The wheel, let’s imagine,
is set to mechanically give you a reading which is simply ten times the distance
rolled by the wheel: viz. 10. This (in cm2 units) turns out to be exactly the area
enclosed by the curve. Why?
The explanation of the reliable functioning of such polar planimeter turns on
the fairly easily provable fact that the area (A) inside the closed curve is equal to
the length (L) of the arm YZ times the distance (D) rolled by the wheel.17
quantifies s, the distance travelled, and it clearly depends additively on local features of the line.
16Simple closed curve does not cross itself like, say, the figure of eight.
17As said, for our imaginary planimeter L=10cm, of course. The regularity in equation (2) has an
interesting, purely geometrical derivation, which furnishes a further non-causal, ‘distinctly mathem-
atical’ explanation of the regularity itself. See (Jennings [1994]).
15
A = LD (2)
This simple equation brings out explanatory dependencies between the relevant
geometrical variables pertaining to the set-up’s geometry of motion: the distance
D rolled by the wheel depends on A (and a fixed L). This dependence of the rolled
distance D on the non-local explanans variable is non-causal, for clearly the area
as a non-local variable does not cause the wheel to roll, or cause ‘the final read-
ing’. Nor is the dependence in any relevant way based on the laws of motion or
forces involved in the process. This dependence is nevertheless explanatory, since
we know precisely how D would have been different, had the area been smaller
or larger, and we know that D had nothing to do with any specific local feature
of the path around A or the causes of the planimeter’s motion. This dependence
is furthermore asymmetric, since the area only depends on the path taken by the
pointer (Z). Finally, there are geometrical constraints to the system given its set-up
(fixed pivot point, single hinge, the length of the rigid arms, etc.): these constraints
limit the possible (kinematic) states the system can occupy. The explanation of po-
lar planimeter’s correct reading shares all the key features identified in connection
with the initial exemplar. In particular, as we have seen, there are non-local geo-
metrical facts about the space of possible states associated with a polar planimeter
that are explanatory without being causal.
So, some, but not all, kinematic explanations are non-causal. But is it the case
that all non-causal explanations that thus turn on non-local ‘geometry of motion’
are exclusive to kinematics? The answer is no. There are significant non-causal
explanations in physics that, despite falling on the dynamics’ side of physicists’
division, turn on ‘geometry of motion’ in a way exemplified by our kinematic ex-
emplar. One paradigmatic geometrical explanation in mechanics pertains to the
so-called ‘geometrical phase’ of a dynamical system. This is broad-ranging phe-
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nomenon, but some of its instances are closely related to our toy example. Consider
the familiar Foucault’s pendulum, for instance. It exhibits a phase shift in the pen-
dulum’s plane of motion that is explained in terms of ‘geometry of motion’. The
turning of Foucault’s pendulum is too often falsely ‘explained’ in terms of the idea
that the pendulum’s plane of motion remains fixed as Earth rotates ‘underneath it’.
This idea completely fails to account for the precession of the pendulum, however:
the fact that the plane of motion fails to return to its original orientation after a
full (24h) revolution of the Earth—unless the pendulum is located at a pole or the
equator. In reality the phenomenon can be explained in purely geometrical terms.
The daily precession α′ experienced by a Foucault pendulum, as a function
of the latitude λ, is given by α′ = −2pi sinλ. This is known as a geometrical
phase (or (an)holonomy, or Hannay’s angle) of a classical dynamical system that
travels a closed loop in a parameter space without returning to its original state.
As suggested by its name, geometrical phase depends on geometrical features. As
said, in some cases it does so in a way that is closely related to our toy example.
The overall phase shift of Foucault’s pendulum, for example, is equal to the solid
angle subtended by the circle of latitude, i.e. α = 2pi(1 − sinλ) = r−2 × A.18
The geometrical nature of the phenomenon allows the phase shift to be derived
from geometrical considerations that indicate how the dependence of the phase
shift on latitude, as captured by this equation, has ‘a deep geometric meaning and
is independent of the local properties of the path—it depends only on the enclosed
area.’ (von Bergmann et al. [2007], p. 891)
A geometrical explanation of Hannay’s angle requires the use of dynamical
concepts, as the phenomenon depends on the motion exhibiting conservation of
momentum, for instance. More generally, it depends on the Hamiltonian, which
must be integrable, and the requirement that the Hamiltonian’s excursion in the
18A is the area of the Earth’s surface enclosed by the circle of latitude; r is the radius of the Earth.
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parameter space is sufficiently slow, i.e. adiabatic.19 Nevertheless, despite this
dynamic context, the explanation has a geometrical character that is robust and
non-local in the sense exemplified by kinematic explanations from ‘geometry of
motion’: the explanation is fully independent of the specific laws and causes in the
sense that the geometrical phase only depends on non-local geometrical variables
involved in a closed loop in the system’s parameter space. For Foucault’s pendu-
lum, for instance, it does not matter how fast or slowly we complete the rotation
of the globe (as long as we do it adiabatically, of course). Neither does it matter
at all what the causes (if any) of the rotation are. This explanation from ‘geometry
of motion’ is thus robust and non-local as per our exemplar, and thus non-causal in
this sense.
I will bring this section to a close by precisifying further the present viewpoint
by contrasting it to an explanation discussed in (Lange [2013]). The why-question
at stake involves a double pendulum in homogeneous gravitational field, which (as
a matter of necessity) has at least four equilibrium configurations. Why is that?
** FIGURE 3 – DOUBLE PENDULUM – GOES HERE **
Lange documents an explanation of the number of equilibrium configurations
that is ‘distinctly mathematical’, and in his view also non-causal. As is well known,
the configuration space of a double pendulum is a torus parameterised by the two
angles α and β (Figure 3). The explanation of interest turns on a general geo-
metrical fact about compact surfaces such as this configuration space: most dif-
ferentiable functions are Morse functions, which on a compact surface of genus g
have at least 2g + 2 critical points. A torus (g = 1) thus has at least four critical
points (viz. saddle points, maxima, or minima). The potential energy function of
the system is given by a Morse function; it thus has at least four critical points.
19See (Hannay [1985]) or (Arnold [1989]) for details and other examples.
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Each critical point of the potential energy function is also an equilibrium point: at
critical points the gradient of the potential energy vanishes, and this amounts to
there being no force, viz. an equilibrium.
** FIGURE 4 – PENDULUM’S CONFIG. SPACE – GOES HERE **
This explanation, too, clearly belongs to dynamics (as opposed to kinematics),
depending on a potential energy function and forces deriving from it. As Lange
([2013]) puts it, the explanation appeals to ‘a natural law: a system is at equilib-
rium exactly when the net force on each of its parts is zero (i.e. when its potential
energy is stationary)—a particular case of Newton’s second law.’ (p. 503). Lange
nevertheless argues that the explanation is a non-causal one, since it does not in-
clude any specific information about the way in which the system evolves under
force.
Any causal explanation in terms of forces (or energy) must go beyond New-
ton’s second law to describe the particular forces at work (or energy function
in play)—if not specifying them fully, then at least giving their relevant fea-
tures (such as their proportionality to the inverse-square of the distance). That
is why the distinctively mathematical double-pendulum explanation I have
just described is non-causal despite including Newton’s second law. (Ibid.)
But I am not sure why an explanation should thus involve any more specific
features of the forces at work (or their effect on motion) in order to be causal.
Admittedly the causal information provided by (the pared-down version of) New-
ton’s second law is rather abstract, but arguably this is all the causal information
that is relevant for the (relatively abstract) explanandum at stake. The explana-
tion brings out the way in which for almost any configuration of the system there
are local differences in the potential energy that cause the system to move, apart
from a few (but at least four) equilibrium configurations. By virtue of saying all
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this about the causes within a double pendulum system we might well be inclined
to regard this as a causal explanation. (Note that with respect to its high degree
of abstractness this explanation is not that different from the causal equilibrium
explanation discussed in section §2—the equilibrium explanation did not require
specific information about particular forces at work either.)20
It may nevertheless seem that there is a significant non-causal aspect to the
double pendulum explanation, turning on the fact that the configuration space is
a torus—a fact about the global ‘geometry of motion’. Given this, is there still a
close parallel between this explanation and the non-causal explanations explored
above? I do not think so. For while it is true that there is a non-causal aspect to this
(in my view causal) explanation in a sense, this can be taken to be merely due to the
specific why-question at stake. The explanation for the equilibrium nature of each
of the critical points, taken individually, turns on relatively local matters: there are
no forces at this configuration, but forces would be in play were the system to shift
to any nearby configuration allowed by the kinematic constraints. The fact that
there are more than one—or, as it turns out, more than three—such equilibrium
points altogether is, unsurprisingly, a non-local feature of the system. Thus, the
explanation turns on non-local matters regarding the configuration space purely by
virtue of asking a question about such non-particular fact. This is quite a different
explanatory input from the cases of ‘geometry of motion’ explored above.
4 Beyond classical mechanics
Thus far we have discussed non-causal explanations firmly in the context of clas-
sical mechanics. But the key idea applies naturally also to other areas of phys-
ics where we can conceptually distinguish between pertinent non-local explanat-
20The two explanations are quite different with respect to their explanans, however, for while the
explanandum of the equilibrium explanation is an individual event, in the present case the explanan-
dum is a more abstract regularity without any corresponding individual event.
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ory facts regarding the space of possible physical states of a system, and its laws
of evolution.21 In the light of this general distinction, the leading idea of this
paper—that some non-causal explanations may completely turn on non-local geo-
metrical facts about a system’s space of possible physical states, viz. its ‘geometry
of motion’—is not at all wedded or native to classical mechanics. Rather, such
non-causal explanations can take place whenever a theory posits a space of pos-
sible physical states with sufficiently rich structure to ground robust explanatory
non-causal dependencies of the sort we have explored above. Here I provide a
further example to illustrate this.
The discussion of geometrical phase above anticipates a natural extension of
our analysis beyond classical mechanics. A huge range of physical phenomena is
accountable in terms of an anholonomy in a system’s parameter space; Hannay’s
phase in classical mechanics is but a special case.22 For example, in quantum
mechanics the so-called Berry phase relates to the fact that a system’s wavefunc-
tion often exhibits a phase difference after its parameters cycle slowly (adiabatic-
ally) around a circuit in an abstract parameter space that specifies the system in
relation to its environment. In general terms, it follows from Schrödinger’s equa-
tion that for a slowly changing Hamiltonian H(R) that depends on parameters
R1(t), R2(t),. . . , Rn(t), and for a system in a discrete eigenstate ψn ofH(R), the
geometric phase shift over a closed circuitR0 → RT in parameter space is
γn(T ) = i
∮
〈ψn|∇Rψn〉
This phase difference again depends only on non-local geometrical properties of
the circuit in parameter space, and it is independent of the time taken to complete
21The conceptual distinction between kinematics and dynamics is also completely independent
from mechanics.
22There are various known examples of geometrical phase, coming e.g. from classical optics,
nuclear magnetic resonance, hydrodynamics, and quantum field theory. See (Wilczek et al. [1989]).
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the circuit (apart from the requirement that the process is slow enough to constitute
an adiabatic chance). In the simplest cases the phase difference is proportional to
the area enclosed by the circuit, in close analogy to the classical Hannay’s angle of
Foucault’s pendulum.
For a concrete example (adapted from Griffiths [1995]), consider a spin S =
h¯
2
neutron in a magnetic field B(t) that is constant in its magnitude but changes
direction. In particular, assume that B(t) makes a fixed angle α with the z-axis,
precessing around it at constant angular velocity ω. Assume that the neutron starts
in a spin-up eigenstate in direction of B(0). When the direction of B(t) slowly
shifts, the neutron remains in a spin-up eigenstate in the direction of the magnetic
field. Returning to the starting point in the parameter space, the neutron is in
the original eigenstate but it has acquired a geometric phase which, for such an
adiabatic excursion around the parameter space of the HamiltonianH(t) = e
m
B·S,
is
γ(T ) = pi(cosα− 1).
That is, the geometric phase is proportional to the solid angle subtended by the
magnetic field vector from the origin. Thus this equation brings out the precise
functional dependence of the Berry phase only on the non-local geometrical vari-
able determined by α. Furthermore, this result generalises to arbitrary closed ex-
cursions of the Hamiltonian in the parameter space: if the shifting direction of
the magnetic field leads the neutron’s spin adiabatically around an arbitrary closed
path, the geometric phase shift is equal to minus one half the solid angle swept
out by the magnetic field vector. (See for example Griffiths [1995].) This depend-
ence of the phase shift on non-local features of such a cyclic change is a purely
geometric consequence of the assumption that the particle’s quantum state obeys
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Schrödinger’s equation: the phase shift is given by a closed line integral in para-
meter space that is independent not only of any local features determining the shape
of the excursion, but also of the rate at which the excursion is done and the energy
of the system.23
In Berry’s treatment of quantum geometric phase he required that the system
remains in the same eigenstate of the Hamiltonian at every instant throughout this
evolution. This adiabaticity requirement has been relaxed in the subsequent work,
for example in (Aharonov and Anandan [1987]), and (Anandan and Stodolsky
[1987]). In their more general treatment of quantum geometric phase Anandan
et al. also associated the phenomenon directly with the ‘motion’ of the quantum
system, as opposed to tracking the particular Hamiltonian used to achieve this mo-
tion. Thus, the features of the geometry of motion at play can be associated with
the quantum mechanical state itself, and this furthermore does not depend on the
requirement of adiabaticity for the varying environment (the Hamiltonian). Fur-
thermore, Mukunda and Simon ([1993]) show how the geometric phase can be
decoupled from Hamiltonian dynamics altogether by construing it in even more
fundamental terms as a purely kinematic consequence of the structure of Hilbert
space, being a non-local property of curves connecting quantum state vectors. This
brings out even more forcefully its purely geometrical nature.
In the philosophical literature Batterman ([2003]) has rightly emphasised the
23The reality of this kind of phase shift has been well documented in neutron interferometry,
for instance, where the spin polarisation of neutrons travelling through a magnetic field is rotated
‘around a loop’. The geometric phase shift produced by the experiment contributes to the total
phase difference with the other interferometer path, revealed in the diffraction pattern. (See Werner
[2012] for a recent review.) But did I not just use causal language to describe all this, saying that the
experimental set-up produces a given phase-shift to one of the neutron currents in the interferometer?
Does the magnetic field cause the neutron wavefunction phase to shift, after all? Yes, and no. When
we describe an experimental set-up in higher-level terms, or explain its diffraction pattern outcome
in terms of the regularities pertaining to the relevant variables, we can, of course, appeal to causal
notions in as far as those variables are amenable to a causal reading by virtue of being intervenable.
At a more fundamental level, when describing what happens when the neutrons travel through the
magnetic field, the relevant explanatory variables are no longer amenable to such causal reading,
however.
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importance of non-causal explanations from geometrical phase. According to Bat-
terman ([2003]) the ‘most remarkable features’ of the Berry phase, for example, is
‘the fact that topological and geometric structures of an abstract space of paramet-
ers can have observable, physical, but obviously noncausal “effects”’. (p. 553) I
have been writing very much in the same spirit, offering an analysis of the non-
causal character of these explanations: the geometrical structures pertaining to
the system’s ‘geometry of motion’ are explanatory by virtue of providing coun-
terfactual information about an asymmetric dependence of the explanandum on
non-local geometrical features of the space of possible states of the system. The
prevalence of such explanations remains to be further examined; there are various
explanations that physicists characterise as ‘purely kinematic’ or ‘purely geomet-
rical’, and many of these, I suspect, bear the hallmarks of non-causal explanations
from ‘geometry of motion’.24
5 Conclusion: a worthwhile distinction
This paper has engaged with an issue of demarcation: drawing a line between
causal and (some) non-causal explanations. How worthwhile is this demarcation
issue? One might worry that the issue ultimately turns out to be largely termino-
logical: ‘So you think it is worth calling that a ‘cause’? Well, I do not!’ All the
more so, perhaps, given that I have argued that non-causal explanation from ‘geo-
metry of motion’ only require a natural extension of already broadly applicable
counterfactual framework for analysing explanations.
There are actually two distinct issues here, one concerning the value of draw-
ing the distinction in causal terms, the other concerning the value of drawing the
distinction at all. I care more profoundly about the latter issue, and I think the
24For example, I am inclined to think (pace Skow [2013]) that various explanations turning on the
Pauli exclusion principle, fit this mould, although I will not argue for this here.
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significance of the distinction at stake is ultimately underwritten by its value to sci-
ence. It really matters to science that we can recognise and are able to conceive of
different kinds of scientific explanations: some straightforwardly dynamical and
causal; others geometrical, non-local, and (explanatorily) independent of the dy-
namics.25 The recognition of the existence of explanation-supporting dependences
of the latter ilk is a hugely significant scientific achievement, and it marks a natural
‘joint’ in the nature of scientific explanation. It is a joint that furthermore natur-
ally supports philosophers’ renouncement of the hegemony of causal explanation.
Insisting on the hegemony, it seems to me, only serves to satisfy an outdated philo-
sophical prejudice at the price of weakening our intuitive grasp on causation and
causal explanation.
At the same time, the significance of the distinction at hand should not be taken
to signify the need for a radically different account of explanation. Rather, a coun-
terfactual framework along the lines of (Woodward [2003]) still functions well as
a philosophical framework for analysing non-causal explanations from ‘geometry
of motion’, for these explanations also turn on informative functional regularities
that are invariant under changes in clearly identifiable explanans variables that lead
to answers to ‘what-if-things-had-been-different’ questions. It is only the robustly
non-local geometrical nature of the explanans variables that demarcate these ex-
planations from otherwise profoundly similar causal explanations.
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Figure 1: Parallel transport of a stick on a spherical surface.
Figure 2: Polar planimeter. From (Jennings [1994], p. 39).
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Figure 3: Double pendulum. From (Lange [2013]).
Figure 4: Pendulum’s configuration space with a potential energy function.
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